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The Implication of a Private Damage
Action From the Taylor Law's Ban on
Public Sector Strikes
Andrew A. Petersont
I. Introduction
At common law, civil remedies, including suits for damages,
were available to parties injured by strikes in the private sector.1
Such damage actions became, for the most part, pre-empted by
federal statutes specifically granting private sector employees
the right to engage in certain protected concerted activities.2
Even today, however, damage actions remain available where
private sector strikes go beyond statutory protections or violate
contractual provisions.3
Public sector labor law has had a markedly different devel-
opment.4 Statutory protection of public employees' bargaining
rights is a relatively recent phenomenon.' In contrast to the lim-
ited statutory protection afforded strikes in the private sector,
t LL.M. (Labor Law), New York University School of Law; J.D., St. John's Univer-
sity School of Law; B.S. (Industrial & Labor Relations), Cornell University. Mr. Peterson
is a member of the national law firm of Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler & Krupman in its
White Plains, New York office.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance and support of his colleagues at
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1. For an excellent discussion of common-law "aspects of the law of torts in relation
to labor unions," see C. GREGORY & H. KATz, LABOR AND THE LAW 88-95 (3d ed. 1979).
See also F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 6.
2. This protection came primarily in sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 17 (1983); 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1983); sections 4 and 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 104, 107 (1983); and section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §
157 (1983).
3. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 185, 187 (1983).
4. See generally K. HANSLOWE, THE EMERGING LAW OF LABOR RELATIONS IN PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT (1967); B. Schneider, Public-Sector Labor Legislation - An Evolutionary
Analysis, in PUBLIC-SECTOR BARGAINING (B. Aaron, J. Grodin, J. Stern eds. 1979).
5. See Schneider, supra note 4, at 192-93 n.2.
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state laws have, with virtual unanimity, declared strikes by pub-
lic employees illegal and against public policy.6 New York's Tay-
lor Law' exemplifies the majority approach.
If logic determined the availability of damage actions to pri-
vate parties injured by illegal public sector strikes, the analytical
approach might be as follows. Damage actions were available
when private sector strikes did not have affirmative statutory
protection. Certainly, then, actions for damages should be avail-
able for public sector strikes, which, rather than being statuto-
rily protected, have affirmative statutory condemnation. In fact,
denying such relief would grant public sector strikes an insula-
tion from monetary damages greater than private sector strikes
enjoy. This is because damage actions for illegal private sector
strikes are available even today. It would therefore seem that a
private damage remedy should be available in the context of ille-
gal public sector strikes, which have also been condemned as
contrary to established public policy.
Interestingly, the very fact that public sector strikes are ex-
pressly made unlawful, by itself, has complicated what should be
the very straightforward analysis outlined above. An initial
question is whether the strike penalties prescribed by the public
sector statutes were intended to be the exclusive remedies for
illegal strikes. Since the National Labor Relations Act 8
prescribes no penalties - because private sector unions gener-
ally have the right to strike - exclusivity is not a hurdle for a
damage action based on an illegal private sector strike.
Further, so-called "policy" issues concerning accountability
for illegal strikes become clouded in the public sector. A private
sector union that strikes illegally has full legal accountability for
any damages it causes. Yet, under ill-conceived notions of "pol-
icy," courts have actually shielded public sector unions from
such accountability.9
The causes of action and legal issues potentially applicable
in the context of damage actions for illegal public sector strikes
are manifold. This Article directly addresses 1) the key issue of
6. Id. at 203.
7. N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW §§ 200-215 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1988).
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-169 (1983).
9. See infra Part IV.
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exclusivity in the context of 2) a key cause of action as inter-
preted by 3) the key jurisdiction of New York under 4) a key
statute, the Taylor Law.
It is hoped that this analysis will help clarify the issue in
New York and provide some guidance for those jurisdictions
that have yet to consider the availability of damage actions for
illegal public sector strikes.
II. Statutory Remedies Should Not Be Deemed Exclusive
Part and parcel of the question of whether a cause of action
may be implied from violation of a statutory no-strike ban is
whether statutory strike penalties are exclusive. This "exclusiv-
ity" issue was first considered by a New York court more than a
decade ago.
In Caso v. District Council 37,10 the second department
ruled that third parties to the bargaining relation could sue pub-
lic sector unions for damages inflicted by an illegal strike. Caso
involved an illegal strike by the employees who operated New
York City's sewage treatment plants. As a result of the strike, a
billion gallons of raw sewage were discharged into the upper
East River. This sewage was, in turn, carried by tidal forces into
the Long Island Sound and onto the beaches of two Nassau
County towns. Nassau County Executive Ralph Caso joined with
the supervisors of the affected towns in bringing suit - in their
individual and official capacities - against the offending un-
ions and their officers."
The question of whether the Taylor Law's strike remedies
are exclusive was squarely presented to the appellate division in
Caso. Concluding that the statutory remedies were not exclusive,
the court said that the Taylor Law:
was intended to monitor employer-employee relationships and
not public employee relations with the public .... Clearly, this
law was a response to the unique problems of public employer-
employee relations. Just as clearly, it was not intended to govern
public employee relations with the general public or others....
The purposes of the Taylor Law and the prohibition against
10. 43 A.D.2d 159, 350 N.Y.S.2d 173 (2d Dep't 1973).
11. See Caso v. Gotbaum, 67 Misc. 2d 205, 323 N.Y.S.2d 742 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 38 A.D.2d 955, 331 N.Y.S.2d 507 (2d Dep't 1972).
1988]
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public employee strikes, as well as the general welfare of the pub-
lic, are best served by permitting appropriate redress for violation
of the law .... Since the Legislature apparently found that fiscal
constraints were appropriate to punish union transgressions, it
does not seem that the form, whether fines or damages, is a con-
trolling distinction....
As it applies to the instant case, there is no Taylor Law pro-
vision limiting the remedies available against a striking public
employees' union.1"
The court rejected the union's efforts to avoid liability for
the damages caused by its strike, stating:
Read the way the defendants suggest, the Taylor Law would be-
come an impenetrable shield of immunity for public employees
who may illegally cause serious damage to persons or parties
other than their employer. There is no support for such protec-
tion in the statute itself, in the language of the legislative com-
mittee which studied the area and drafted the bill, or in reason.
Nor is there any wisdom in a decision which puts the "right" of a
public union to engage in illegal activities entirely beyond the
court's ability to find suitable redress .... Is
The second department's conclusion that Taylor Law remedies
are not exclusive promptly found support in People v. Vizzini. 1"
There, too, the court found that the statute does not, in words
or intent, limit remedies available to third parties to the bar-
gaining relation. Rather, the court concluded that "the legisla-
ture left strikes with more serious consequences to whatever
penalties might attach."1 6
When Caso was decided, the only New York case that ar-
guably supported an exclusivity argument was Jamur Products
Corp. v. Quill. 6 That case dismissed a suit for damages implied
from the Condon-Wadlin Act (the predecessor of the Taylor
Law)1 7 that arose out of the 1966 transit strike. The Caso court
12. Caso v. District Council 37, 43 A.D.2d 159, 161-62, 350 N.Y.S.2d 173, 176-77 (2d
Dep't 1973) (emphasis added).
13. Id. at 162, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 177.
14. 78 Misc. 2d 1040, 359 N.Y.S.2d 143 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1974).
15. Id. at 1046, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 150.
16. 51 Misc. 2d 501, 273 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1966).
17. The Condon-Wadlin Act was enacted by the New York State Legislature in
1947, codifying New York's common-law ban on public employee strikes. Condon-Wadlin
[Vol. 8:571
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severely criticized the assumption underlying Jamur that the
damages flowing from a public employees' strike are tangential
or secondary. 18 Indeed, the court in Caso specifically rejected the
Jamur court's statement that "the risk of damage in the subway
strike was unforeseeable [since] it is the very inevitability of ex-
tensive damage which led to the prohibition of public strikes."'19
The Caso court thus understood that Jamur adopted what
amounted to, at best, a most unrealistic view of the world.
As a later court would observe, the Taylor Law's "compre-
hensive scheme of injunctions, loss of pay, and the unions' loss
of dues check-off privileges simply reflected 'the Legislature's at-
tempt to delicately balance the rights of public employees
against those of their employers.' "20 It was not intended to
"monitor ... employee relations with the public."'2 1
III. Violation of Taylor Law Strike Ban: An Implied Cause of
Action
Once the "exclusivity" hurdle is cleared, attention must
turn to the potential bases of actions by third parties to the bar-
gaining relation. Such bases are numerous.22 This Article will
Act, ch. 391, § 1, 1947 N.Y. Laws 842, 842-43. The Act also imposed severe strike penal-
ties. It required the termination of any public employee who participated in a strike. Id.
While a striker could seek reemployment with the public entity, he or she would have to
work for the next five years "without tenure and at the pleasure of the appointing body
or officer." Id. A rehired striker could not receive a raise as a result of the strike, or for
three years following reemployment. Id.
The Condon-Wadlin Act was replaced by the Taylor Law in 1967. While protecting
the bargaining rights of New York's public employees for the first time, the Taylor Act
also retained an absolute ban on strikes. Taylor Law, ch. 392, § 2, 1967 N.Y. Laws 1102,
1104, 1109-11.
18. Caso, 43 A.D.2d at 163, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 177.
19. Id.
20. Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner, 88 A.D.2d 50, 58, 452
N.Y.S.2d 80, 85 (2d Dep't 1982), (quoting Caso, 43 A.D.2d at 161, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 176)
modifying 108 Misc. 2d 458, 437 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1981), aff'd, 59 N.Y.2d 314, 451 N.E.2d
459, 464 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1983) [hereinafter TWUJ.
21. Id.
22. For example, in its suit against a striking union, see infra notes 85 to 153 and
accompanying text, Jackson, Lewis, Schnitzler & Krupman, a law firm, asserted the fol-
lowing causes of action in addition to those discussed herein: (1) tortious interference
with business; (2) common law, noncategorized, tort of malice; (3) tortious conspiracy to
violate the Taylor Law, the March 31, 1980, injunction, and plaintiff's rights; and (4) as
third-party beneficiary of the union's collective bargaining agreement with NYCTA. See
1988]
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consider the question of whether a private cause of action may
be implied from violation of the Taylor Law's strike prohibition.
New York courts have long applied a simple rule to deter-
mine the availability of a private damage action where a statu-
tory command has been breached. The rule had been that a
member of a class for whose benefit a statute was enacted may
recover the damages proximately resulting from a violation of
that law.23 However, recent cases, discussed below, seem to sug-
gest that New York may have now adopted the federal stan-
dards for implied causes of action announced by the United
States Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash. The standards require
that: 1) plaintiff be a member of the class for whose benefit the
statute was enacted;25 2) there be an indication of legislative in-
tent to create the federal right for the plaintiff (or the absence of
an indication of legislative intent not to create the right) ;16 3)
the implication of such a right be consistent with the statutory
scheme; 2 and 4) the cause of action not be one traditionally
relegated to state law in an area of particularly state concern.28
The Supreme Court developed the Cort v. Ash standards in
order to cope with a particular federal problem: the explosion of
federal litigation resulting from a rapid proliferation of federal
statutes.29 No persuasive reason has appeared for abandoning
the once-settled New York rule in favor of standards that were
developed in response to a peculiarly federal problem. In any
event, in view of the currently unsettled state of New York
law,30 the implied cause of action theory will be addressed under
both the traditional New York and the Cort v. Ash standards.
Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner, 88 A.D.2d 50, 53-54, 452 N.Y.S.2d
80, 82 (2d Dep't 1982).
23. Indeed, the court of appeals has described the rules as "so general and well es-
tablished that it is not subject to debate or question .... " Abounader v. Strohmeyer &
Arpe Co., 243 N.Y. 458, 466, 154 N.E. 309, 311 (1926).
24. 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Kaplan, Implied Causes of Action, 8 LITIGATION [Journal of ABA Litigation
Section], 33-34 (Summer 1982).
30. See infra notes 178-179 and accompanying text.
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A. The Traditional New York Rule
1. Genesis of the Rule
For more than one hundred years, the court of appeals had
consistently held that where a statute is violated to the detri-
ment of one whom the statute was intended to protect, an ac-
tion for damages will be implied: "in every case where a statute
enacts or prohibits a thing for the benefit of a person, he shall
have a remedy upon the same statute for the thing enacted for
his advantage, or for the recompense of a wrong done to him
contrary to the said law."'" The court of appeals reexamined the
rule in 1926. In Abounader v. Strohmeyer & Arpe Co.,s" a case
arising out of a breach of a statute governing the labeling of food
products, the court held that "when the duty imposed by the
statute is manifestly intended for the protection and benefit of
individuals, the common law, when an individual is injured by
the breach of the duty, will supply a remedy if the statute gives
none. "
3 3
The Abounader court directly addressed the question of
whether a statute enacted for the benefit of the general public
would give rise to an individual action for damages. The court
held that it would.
Holding then that this statute was passed for the benefit and pro-
tection of the general public and that it imposed upon one like
the defendant a duty to the public and each member thereof, it
is... well settled that such an one who has suffered from a disre-
gard and violation of the duty has a cause of action for his dam-
ages against the one who has disregarded his duty. From the duty
and its violation there is implied a cause of action in favor of the
one for whose benefit the duty was imposed and who has been
injured by its violation. No element of ordinary negligence is es-
sential. Violation becomes actionable default.3 4
Since Abounader, the court of appeals has repeatedly sus-
31. Willy v. Mulledy, 78 N.Y. 310, 314 (1879) (emphasis added). Accord Martin v.
Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 168, 126 N.E. 814, 815 (1920); Karpeles v. Heine, 227 N.Y. 74, 79,
124 N.E. 101, 102 (1919); Amberg v. Kinley, 214 N.Y. 531, 535, 108 N.E. 830, 831 (1915).
32. 243 N.Y. 458, 154 N.E. 309 (1926).
33. Id. at 466, 154 N.E. at 311 (quoting 2 COOLEY ON TORTS 1408 (3d ed.)) (emphasis
added).
34. Id. at 465-66, 154 N.E. at 311 (emphasis added).
19881
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tained this as the New York rule." Lower New York courts have
been faithful in applying that rule. "In the State of New York,
when a statute imposes a duty, any person having a special in-
terest in the performance thereof may sue for a breach which
caused him damage.""8 The rule, indeed, was recently reiterated
by the appellate division in Kohler v. Ford Motor Credit Co.,
stating: "A person injured by the violation of a statutory duty is
permitted to maintain an action for that violation if he is within
the class of persons intended to be protected by the statute. ' '3 7
Consistent with this traditional rule, actions implied from
statutory violations had been dismissed by New York courts
35. See, e.g., Filardo v. Foley Bros., Inc., 297 N.Y. 217, 222, 78 N.E.2d 480, 482
(1948) (violation of statutory duty gives rise to cause of action for damages), rev'd on
other grounds, 336 U.S. 281 (1949); Maloney v. Hearst Hotels Corp., 274 N.Y. 106, 110, 8
N.E.2d 296, 297 (1937) (liability arises from failure to observe ordinances); Schmidt v.
Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 305, 200 N.E. 824, 829 (1936) (statutory
duty imposed for benefit of particular group creates liability per se and implies right of
recovery); Pine Grove Poultry Farm, Inc. v. Newton By-Products Mfg. Co., 248 N.Y. 293,
297, 162 N.E. 84, 85 (1928) (violation of statutory duty is negligence as a matter of law
and gives rise to right of recovery for injuries sustained).
36. Hopkins v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 265 A.D. 278, 283, 38 N.Y.S,2d 788, 793 (1st
Dep't 1942) (contrasting the New York rule with the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Law of
New Jersey). Accord General Teleradio, Inc. v. Manuti, 284 A.D. 400, 405, 131 N.Y.S.2d
365, 369 (1st Dep't 1954) (finding a right of action in the state courts for violations of the
Lea Act); Town of Waterford v. Brockett Lumber Co., 227 A.D. 422, 426, 237 N.Y.S. 436,
441 (3d Dep't 1929) (holding that willful injury to highway is punishable under penal
law).
37. Kohler v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 112 Misc. 2d 480, 482, 447 N.Y.S.2d 215, 217
(Sup. Ct. Albany County 1982) (citations omitted). See also Goldstein v. Mangano, 99
Misc. 2d 523, 528, 417 N.Y.S.2d 368, 372 (N.Y. Civ. Ct., Kings County 1978) ("New York
law has long recognized that where a statute imposes a duty, breach of that duty gives
the offended party a cause of action."); Johnson v. Clay Partition Co., 93 Misc. 2d 414,
416, 402 N.Y.S.2d 912, 914 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1977) (" 'The rule is well settled that
where a criminal or penal statute imposes a duty but furnishes no civil remedy to the
protected class, a breach of that duty gives rise to a cause of action in favor of the latter
class.' "); Hornbeck v. Towner, 25 Misc. 2d 956, 957, 208 N.Y.S.2d 785, 786 (Sup. Ct.
Sullivan County 1960) ("Yet, a violation of section 95 thereof gives rise to a cause of
action in favor of a person damaged thereby, even though that section does not expressly
confer or create a cause of action."); Emerald Packing Corp. v. Hygrade Food Products
Corp., 21 Misc. 2d 919, 920, 194 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct., N.Y. County 1959) ("It
is clear to this court that ... in the case at bar .... [for] violation of these statutes ... a
cause of action exists."); Munzer v. Blaisdell, 183 Misc. 773, 775, 49 N.Y.S.2d 915, 917
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1944) ("[I]t is well settled that, where a positive duty is imposed
by statute, a breach of that duty will give rise to a cause of action for damages on the
part of the person for whose benefit the duty was imposed .... ").
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol8/iss3/3
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only where 1) there was no violation of the statute involved,38 2)
the party bringing the action was not a member of the class in-
tended to be benefited by the statute,39 or 3) the damages suf-
fered were not proximately caused by the statutory violation. 0
2. Elements of the Cause of Action Under the Traditional
Rule
Accordingly, under the traditional New York rule, a cause of
action for damages implied from violation of the Taylor Law
should have two elements: 1) membership in the class of in-
tended beneficiaries of the Taylor Law's strike ban, and 2) dam-
ages that were proximately caused by the illegal strike.
In Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner
("TWU"), discussed in greater detail below,42 the second de-
partment, properly applying one aspect of Abounader, recently
concluded that every member of the general public is an in-
tended beneficiary of the Taylor Law's strike prohibition. 3 In its
analysis, the second department first quoted the language of sec-
tion 200 of the Civil Service Law and its own earlier construc-
tion of that language in Caso:
"The Legislature of the State of New York [hereby] declares that
it is the public policy of the state and the purpose of this act to
promote harmonious and cooperative relationships between gov-
38. See, e.g., Bourcheix v. Willow Brook Dairy, Inc., 268 N.Y. 1, 5, 196 N.E. 617, 618
(1935) (action based upon common-law negligence of defendant not in privity with plain-
tiff does not give rise to action for statutory violation relating to breach of warranty).
39. See, e.g., Brody v. Save Way N. Boulevard, Inc., 14 N.Y.2d 576, 198 N.E.2d 254,
248 N.Y.S.2d 873 (1964) (retailer's complaint of misleading advertisements dismissed on
ground that retailer, as competitor, had no cause of action) rev'g 19 A.D.2d 714, 242
N.Y.S.2d 422 (2d Dep't 1963); Moch v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 169, 159
N.E. 896, 899 (1928) (an action for failure to furnish an adequate supply of water is not
maintainable for breach of a statutory duty); Di Caprio v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 231
N.Y. 94, 97, 131 N.E. 746, 747 (1921) (only those in the class to be benefited by Railroad
Law can maintain a cause of action).
40. See, e.g., Friedman v. Beck, 250 A.D. 87, 89, 293 N.Y.S. 649, 652 (1st Dep't 1937)
(plaintiff's own conduct rather than defendant's violation of statute was proximate cause
of plaintiffs injuries).
41. 108 Misc. 2d 458, 437 N.Y.S.2d 895 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1981), rev'd, 88
A.D.2d 50, 452 N.Y.S.2d 80 (2d Dep't 1982), afl'd, 59 N.Y.2d 314, 451 N.E.2d 459, 464
N.Y.S.2d 712 (1983).
42. See infra text accompanying notes 106-179.
43. TWU, 88 A.D.2d at 59, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
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ernment and its employees and to protect the public .... These
policies are best effectuated by ...continuing the prohibition
against strikes by public employees and providing remedies for
violations of such prohibition." In Caso v. District Council 37...
we similarly held that the Taylor Law "is intended to govern em-
ployer-employee relationships for the benefit of the public."
Thus, the general public was clearly an intended beneficiary of
the act."'
The court then posed the question of "whether a statute in-
tended to benefit the entire public may be held to imply a pri-
vate right of action for its alleged violation."45 The second de-
partment noted that the statute in Abounader "'was passed for
the benefit and protection of the general public and... imposed
upon one like the defendant a duty to the public and each mem-
ber thereof .... It also cited with approval a commentator's
observation that "statutes explicitly found to have been in-
tended for the benefit of the general public have been used as
the basis for the implication of a private cause of action."4
The Taylor Law clearly was enacted for the benefit of the
general public. Indeed, the history of the Taylor Law shows that
the specific aspect of the law intended to be of greatest benefit
to the general public was its strike ban. The Taylor Law was
proposed by a committee established by the Governor of New
York on January 15, 1966 - three days after an illegal strike of
New York City's transit system by the Transport Workers
Union ("TWU") ended.4 8 An important aspect of the commit-
tee's mission was "to make legislative proposals for protecting
the public against the disruption of vital public services by ille-
gal strikes" since such proposals were "urgently necessary and
. . . widely demanded, as a consequence of the 1966 transit
44. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 200 and Caso v. District
Council 37, 43 A.D.2d 159, 163, 350 N.Y.S.2d 173, 178 (2d Dep't 1973)).
45. Id. (emphasis in original).
46. Id. (quoting Abounader v. Strohmeyer & Arpe Co., 243 N.Y. 458, 465, 154 N.E.
309, 311 (1926)).
47. See Note, Private Damage Actions Against Public Sector Unions for Illegal
Strikes, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1309, 1317 (1978).
48. See Wolk, Public Employee Strikes - A Survey of the Condon-Wadlin Acts,
13 N.Y.L.F. 69, 74 (1967). 39. Governor's Committee on Public Employee Relations, 1966
Final Report 1, 9 (1966) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 8:571
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strike in New York City .... ,,49
The legislature concurred in the urgency of preventing any
repetition of the TWU's or any similar strike. "[T]he cata-
strophic strike of transit workers in New York City . . . has
raised new and urgent demands that something be done, here
and now, to prevent any recurrences of such crippling condi-
tions in any facet of the public service in New York State."5
Thus, from the beginning, the Taylor Law and, in particu-
lar, its strike prohibition, were intended and "passed for the
benefit and protection of the general public."51 It imposed on
public sector unions "a duty to the public and each member
thereof. ' 52 The principal duty imposed upon public employee
unions for the benefit of the general public is to refrain from
striking. This should be sufficient to satisfy the first element of
a cause of action implied from a statutory breach under tradi-
tional New York law - membership in the class of beneficiaries
of the Taylor Law's strike ban. 3
The remaining question under the traditional New York
rule is whether a private party's losses were proximately caused
by the illegal strike. The kinds of damages that members of the
public may suffer as a result of an illegal strike may, of course,
vary depending upon the nature of the interrupted public ser-
vice. Hence, the causation question would necessarily have to be
decided on a case-by-case basis.5
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. Joint Legislative Comm. on Industrial and Labor Conditions, The Key to Labor-
Management Peace and Prosperity in New York, Legis. Doc. No. 40, at 55 (1966) (em-
phasis added).
51. Abounader, 243 N.Y. at 465, 154 N.E. at 311.
52. Id.
53. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
54. Damages shared by the community at large do not result in liability to a private
party. An individual may, however, "maintain an action when he suffers special damage
from a public nuisance." Copart Indus., Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Corp., 41 N.Y.2d
564, 568, 362 N.E.2d 968, 971, 394 N.Y.S.2d 169, 172 (1977). New York courts have rec-
ognized that monetary damages are sufficiently particular to enable a private party to
recover for a public nuisance. For example, in Wakeman v. Wilbur, 147 N.Y. 657, 42 N.E.
341 (1895), the defendant obstructed a public highway, thus making it more costly for
the plaintiff to operate his business. Upholding the private cause of action, the court of
appeals ruled that while the obstruction was "no doubt, an offense against the public," it
was also "in a special and peculiar sense, an injury to the plaintiff." Id. at 664, 42 N.E. at
343.
New York's approach to this question is consistent with the view of a leading
19881
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B. Should Federal Standards Be Applied in New York?
While the traditional New York rule has never explicitly
been abandoned, a 1979 decision by the second department at
least suggested that it may have tacitly been displaced by the
federal Cort v. Ash standards.55 However, that decision, Manfre-
donia v. American Airlines,6 did not adopt the Cort standards
for cases arising under New York law. Certainly, it suggested no
basis for abandoning the longstanding New York rule.
In Manfredonia, a suit was brought in New York by the vic-
tim of an intoxicated fellow airplane passenger to whom the air-
line continued to serve drinks. Among other things, the plaintiff
asserted a right of action implied from a Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration regulation, issued under authority of a federal stat-
ute. 57 The question before the court was "whether the plaintiffs
can assert [an implied] cause of action not based upon the [New
York] Dram Shop Act, but on a Federally created remedy. '58 It
was only in passing upon "a Federally created remedy" that the
Manfredonia court applied the federally-oriented Cort stan-
dards.
In fact, with respect to the proper standard to govern im-
plied causes of action arising under New York statutes, the
Manfredonia court's only comment (in dicta) was that "[t]he
Cort rule is compatible with New York law."'59 The two cases
cited by Manfredonia to support Cort's "compatibility" with
scholar. Professor Prosser has explained:
When the plaintiff is prevented from performing a specific contract, or is put to
additional expense, or expensive delay in performing it, there is no doubt that he
can always maintain his action, since the contract is clearly an individual matter,
not common to the public ....
... [Elven where the business is not itself founded upon the exercise of the
public right, interference with a public right which causes harm to the business, as
by blocking access to a shop which deprives it of customers, or interference with
transportation, which prevents a business establishment from obtaining materials
or labor, or from shipping its goods to market, has been held to cause such partic-
ular damage that the action can be maintained.
Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REv. 997, 1014-15 (1966).
55. See infra text accompanying notes 24-28.
56. 68 A.D.2d 131, 416 N.Y.S.2d 286 (2d Dep't 1979).
57. Manfredonia v. American Airlines, 68 A.D.2d 131, 138-39, 416 N.Y.S.2d 286,
290-91 (2d Dep't 1979). See 49 U.S.C. § 1421(a) (1983).
58. Id. at 139, 416 N.Y.S. 2d at 290 (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 138, 416 N.Y.S. 2d at 291 (emphasis added).
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New York law, however, actually reaffirm the traditional New
York rule.60
In Daggett v. Keshner,61 then Justice Breitel wrote:
Where . .. the statutory duty of care was imposed for the sole
benefit of a class of persons, regardless of the size of the class, of
which the plaintiff is a member, the breach of the statutory duty
generally constitutes conclusive evidence of negligence. It is then,
also, frequently referred to as negligence per se, or negligence as a
matter of law. Even in such cases where liability to the plaintiff is
impliedly created by the statute, before redress may be obtained,
it has been held that the act, wrongful only by statute, must be
the proximate (in the sense of reasonably foreseeable) cause of
the accident.2
So, too, did Pierce v. International Harvester Co.,63 also
cited by Manfredonia, apply the New York rule. That case
noted preliminarily that "violation of a statute constitutes negli-
gence per se." The court continued: "Because of defendant's vio-
lation of section 417 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, . . . plaintiff
contends that defendant was guilty of negligence per se in caus-
ing plaintiff's injuries. If such violation was the proximate cause
of the accident, plaintiff is correct."" Hence, the traditional
New York rule stated above was applied in Pierce as well.
C. An Implied Right of Action Under Cort v. Ash
A simple reading of Cort v. Ash makes it obvious that the
federal standards enunciated there simply could not be adopted
wholesale for application in state court actions arising under
state statutes.65 The fourth Cort standard shows this clearly:
"[I]s the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law,
in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be
60. See supra text accompanying notes 31-54.
61. 284 A.D. 733, 134 N.Y.S.2d 524 (1st Dep't 1954).
62. Id. at 735-36, 134 N.Y.S.2d at 527 (citations omitted) (citing Schmidt, 270 N.Y.
287, 200 N.E. 824; Martin, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814; Karpeles, 227 N.Y. 74, 124 N.E.
101; Amberg, 214 N.Y. 531, 108 N.E. 830; Stern v. Great Island Corp., 250 A.D. 115, 293
N.Y.S. 608 (1st Dep't 1937).
63. 61 A.D.2d 255, 402 N.Y.S.2d 674 (4th Dep't 1978).
64. Id. at 259, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 676 (citation omitted).
65. For the four standards announced by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 78 (1975), see supra text accompanying notes 25-28.
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inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal
law?""6 This standard assumes the availability of a state cause
of action if a federal remedy is denied. It also demonstrates that
the entire Cort test was conceived of as a way of coping with a
peculiarly federal problem. But even if New York did adopt the
three potentially applicable Cort standards, a damage action im-
plied from the Taylor Law should nonetheless be recognized.
The potentially applicable elements of the Cort v. Ash test
are:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit
the statute was enacted," . . . - that is, does the statute create a
federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indica-
tion of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such
a remedy or to deny one? ...Third, is it consistent with the
underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a
remedy for the plaintiff?.67
Since the Taylor Law's strike prohibition was enacted for the
"especial benefit" of the general public, 8 the first Cort standard
is satisfied. The other federal standards also appear to be satis-
fied in actions implied from violation of the Taylor Law's strike
ban.
1. Legislative Intent
The second Cort test considers whether "there [is] any indi-
cation of legislative intent, explicit or implied, either to create
such a remedy or to deny one."6 9 There is no overt evidence of
legislative intent either to recognize or to deny an implied right
under the Taylor Law. However, legislative silence may, in cer-
tain circumstances, be significant. This is particularly true here
because the Taylor Law is far from static. Rather, it is one of the
most frequently examined statutes in the state's codebook.
The New York State Legislature has amended the Taylor
Law on numerous occasions70 in the aftermath of Caso v. Dis-
66. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
67. Id. (citations omitted).
68. See supra text accompanying notes 41-53.
69. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78 (citations omitted).
70. Act effective May 23, 1974, ch. 443, 1974 N.Y. Laws 1314; Act effective May 31,
1974, ch. 724, 1974 N.Y. Laws 1882; Act effective May 31, 1974, ch. 725, 1974 N.Y. Laws
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trict Council 37.71 On none of these occasions has the legislature
so much as intimated disapproval of Caso's conclusion that the
Taylor Law is not an "impenetrable shield" to a civil damage
suit by a third party to the bargaining relation. Significantly,
Caso was decided under the Taylor Law, not Condon-Wadlin,
and it specifically upheld a private suit to recover damages re-
sulting from a Taylor Law breach. By its silence in the after-
math of Caso, the legislature has approved the notion that third
parties to the bargaining relation may sue for damages resulting
from an illegal strike.
In Caso, the private damage action for breach of the Taylor
Law's strike proscription was not asserted in the form of an im-
plied right. However, to the legislature, the availability of a pri-
vate damage action should be more important than the legal
theory invoked. As was said in Caso:
Since the Legislature apparently found that fiscal constraints
were appropriate to punish union transgressions, it does not seem
that the form, whether fines or damages, is a controlling
distinction.
[The Taylor Law is] not an impenetrable shield of immunity
for public employees who may illegally cause serious damage to
persons or parties other than their employees.72
Moreover, there is nothing remarkable about the proposi-
tion that a private damage action may coexist with the Taylor
Law's explicit remedies for illegal strikes. As the court of ap-
peals stated in Abounader: "The fact that penalties are ordained
for violations of course furnishes no argument against [implica-
tion of a private damage action]. Civil responsibility and public
punishment by common usage have long since been established
as appropriate and complementary associates. '73
1886; Act effective Aug. 9, 1975, ch. 850, 1975 N.Y. Laws 1359 (McKinney); Act effective
July 1, 1977, ch. 216, 1977 N.Y. Laws 276 (McKinney); Act approved Aug. 3, 1977, ch.
677, 1977 N.Y. Laws 1081 (McKinney); Act effective July 5, 1978, ch. 465, 1978 N.Y.
Laws 790 (McKinney); Act effective June 28, 1979, ch. 316, 1979 N.Y. Laws 780
(McKinney).
71. 43 A.D.2d 159, 350 N.Y.S.2d 173 (2d Dep't 1973). For a discussion of Caso, see
supra text accompanying notes 10-21.
72. Caso, 43 A.D.2d at 162, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 176-77 (emphasis added).
73. 243 N.Y. at 465, 154 N.E. at 311 (emphasis added).
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In Jamur Products Corp. v. Quill,7 4 a cause of action im-
plied from a violation of the Condon-Wadlin Act was dis-
missed. 5 However, the notion that legislative silence after
Jamur somehow signals an intent to deny an implied right
under the Taylor Law is incongruous. Judicial construction of a
prior statute is, at best, of marginal relevance with respect to
the interpretation of a successor statute. This is particularly
true here, for the very failures of the Condon-Wadlin Act were
the principal reasons for the Taylor Law's enactment. 7
6
Caso, moreover, rejected the fundamental assumption un-
derlying Jamur. Thus, not only was Jamur a construction of a
repealed statute, but the underpinnings of that holding had
been shaken by a subsequent decision rendered under the Tay-
lor Law.7 Again, the legislature never expressed dissatisfaction
with Caso. It could only believe that Jamur retained no prece-
dential value. Accordingly, Caso, not Jamur, reflects the true in-
tent of the law.
In sum, the legislature's refusal to "overrule" Caso signals
its acknowledgement that the Taylor Law's strike prohibition
was intended to coexist with damage actions by third parties to
the bargaining relation. The second Cort standard therefore fa-
vors implication of a private damage remedy.
2. Consistency with the Objective of the Taylor Law
Decisions of the New York courts have always recognized
that strike deterrence was the primary goal of the legislature in
enacting the Taylor Law.7 8 That penalties imposed in the inter-
ests of strike deterrence may be "stern" and "harsh" has in no
way undermined the primacy of that goal. 9 It is equally clear
74. 51 Misc. 2d 501, 273 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1966).
75. Id. at 511, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 357.
76. See Peterson, Deterring Strikes by Public Employees: New York's Two-For-One
Salary Penalty and the 1979 Prison Guard Strike, 34 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. No. 4 545,
546 (July 1981).
77. See supra text accompanying notes 10-21.
78. See TWU, 88 A.D.2d at 64, 452 N.Y.S.2d 89; Cheeseman v. Carey, 485 F. Supp.
203 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), remanded on other grounds, 623 F.2d 1387 (2d Cir. 1980); Tepper
v. Galloway, 481 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Sanford v. Rockefeller, 35 N.Y.2d 547,
324 N.E.2d 113, 364 N.Y.S.2d 450 (1974), appeal dismissed, 421 U.S. 973 (1975); Wilson
v. Board of Educ., 32 N.Y. 2d 636, 295 N.E.2d 387, 342 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1973).
79. See Tepper, 481 F. Supp. 1211; Cheeseman, 485 F. Supp. 203.
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that the legislature intended to use financial costs as a
method - perhaps the principal method - of deterring ille-
gal strikes.80 Caso v. District Council 37, moreover, specifically
acknowledges that a damage remedy is consistent with the legis-
lative goal of strike deterrence:
The purposes of the Taylor Law and the prohibition against pub-
lic employee strikes, as well as the general welfare of the public,
are best served by permitting appropriate redress for violation of
the law .... Since the Legislature apparently found that fiscal
constraints were appropriate to punish union transgressions, it
does not seem that the form, whether fines or damages, is a con-
trolling distinction.1
Fiscal constraints to promote compliance with statutory
commands is not unique to the Taylor Law, or even to labor
relations statutes generally. For example, in concluding that a
private right of action should be implied in favor of those dam-
aged by a violation of section 602 of New York's General Busi-
ness Law,82 the court in Kohler v. Ford Motor Credit Co.,83 re-
cently stated that it: "cannot conceive of a better method of
compelling debt collection agencies to comply with the law than
by subjecting them to private suits by the persons whom their
illegal collection practices have injured."8' Similarly, an implied
cause of action is consistent with, and indeed in furtherance of,
the Taylor Law's primary goal of strike deterrence.
The Taylor Law is also intended to promote harmonious re-
lations between public employers and employees.85 What, then,
of the contention that if third parties could recover the damages
suffered as a result of an illegal strike, unions would be unable
to survive and the Taylor Law's "public employee bargaining ap-
paratus" would be undermined? 8 This "reasoning," which pro-
tects the perpetrator at the victim's expense, is seriously flawed.
The Taylor Law's objective of promoting harmonious rela-
tions between the government and its employees is guaranteed
80. See Caso, 43 A.D.2d at 162-63, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 176-77.
81. Id. at 162, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 176-77 (emphasis added).
82. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 602 (McKinney 1984).
83. 112 Misc. 2d 480, 447 N.Y.S.2d 215 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1982).
84. Id. at 483, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 217.
85. See N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 200 (McKinney 1983).
86. See TWU, 88 A.D.2d at 62, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 88.
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by granting employees the right to form unions and by ensuring
the existence of a collective bargaining apparatus. 7 Prior to the
Taylor Law, public employees in New York had no such guaran-
teed statutory right, and no statutory bargaining apparatus.88
However, the Taylor Law manifestly does not guarantee the
continued existence of any particular union. This principle ap-
plies with even greater force where the union involved is a will-
ful and flagrant violator of the Taylor Law. Thus, even if per-
mitting a private damage action did "jeopardize the very
existence" of a scofflaw union, 9 the Taylor Law's "public em-
ployee bargaining apparatus"90 would not even remotely be
called in question.
Indeed, a judgment against a scofflaw public employee
union in a private damage action would no more undermine the
Taylor Law's bargaining apparatus than the actual bankruptcy
of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers' Organization
("PATCO") undermined the federal employee bargaining appa-
ratus.9' Members of PATCO walked off their jobs after rejecting
a 42-month, $40 million dollar wage and benefit package agreed
on by the union and the Federal Aviation Administration. 2 The
controllers were subsequently dismissed by President Reagan for
violating laws prohibiting walkouts by federal employees.9 3 Col-
lective bargaining with other unionized federal employees has
continued, and the bargaining apparatus remains intact even
for air traffic controllers. 4 While it may be fashionable to criti-
cize the Reagan administration's handling of the PATCO
strike,95 one significant fact is undisputed: after PATCO's, there
87. N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 200 (McKinney 1983).
88. See Peterson, supra note 76, at 547.
89. TWU, 88 A.D.2d at 62, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 88.
90. Id.
91. See "The Union Is Gone," White Collar Rep., BNA, at A-9, A-10 (July 9, 1982).
92. Developments in Industrial Relations, 104 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 48 (Oct. 1981).
93. Id.
94. Indeed, at least some air traffic controllers have attempted to form new unions
in the aftermath of the PATCO debacle. See New Union Bids to Speak for Air Control-
lers, Newsday, June 30, 1984; A Fledgling Effort to Unionize the Air Controllers Again,
BUSINESS WEEK, June 18, 1984, at 25; Some Air Traffic Controllers Petition to Unionize,
New York Times, June 13, 1984, at 16, col. 4.
95. See MANAGEMENT AND EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION (1982), reprinted in Air Traffic Control Revitalization Act of 1981:
Hearings on H.R. 5038 before the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 97th
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have been no further illegal strikes by federal employees.
Where a union demonstrates utter disregard for a statute,
that same statute should not insulate the union from liability to
those injured by the breach. There should be greater concern for
the injured party, not the willful violator. If, by paying for the
damages it causes, a union becomes unable to function and must
dissolve, the law guarantees the employees' right to join a union
to whom disregard of the law and the public interest is a less
acceptable practice."6
In sum, particularly when asserted against a repeated willful
and flagrant violator of the Taylor Law, a private damage action
might well be the best way to promote compliance with the law.
In any event, a private damage action for a violation of the Tay-
lor Law clearly is "consistent with the underlying purposes of
the legislative scheme. '97 Therefore, even if a variation of the
Cort v. Ash standards were adopted, a right of action implied
from violation of the Taylor Law's strike ban should be
recognized.
IV. The 1980 Transit Strike: A Golden Opportunity Missed
At one minute past midnight on April 1, 1980, the TWU
struck New York City's subway and public bus lines.9 8 The
strike was illegal under the Taylor Law, contrary to the long-
standing public policy of the State of New York, and in con-
tempt of an injunction issued by the Supreme Court, Kings
County.9
During its eleven days, the strike brought all subway and
nearly all bus service in New York City to an abrupt stop. The
effect on the general public was immediate and continuing. Dis-
comfort and inconvenience, delay and disruption became not
just the order of the day, but the pattern of life. Traffic reached
gridlock proportions. Thousands clogged the sidewalks. It be-
came exhausting and often impossible to get to work. Social ac-
Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. (1981-1982) (report prepared in the PATCO strike's aftermath by
a government-appointed task force).
96. See N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW §§ 202, 203, 208 (McKinney 1983).
97. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
98. See New York City Transit Auth. v. Lindner, 108 Misc. 2d 458, 460, 437
N.Y.S.2d 895, 898 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1981).
99. See TWU 83 A.D.2d 573, 573-74, 441 N.Y.S.2d 145, 146-47 (2d Dep't 1981).
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tivities had to be abandoned. Despite public outcry and court-
imposed fines, the strike did not end until 8:00 p.m., April 11,
1980.
The results of its illegal 1980 strike came as no surprise to
the TWU. That union had twice before struck all or part of New
York City's mass transportation system. In March 1962, it
struck both the Fifth Avenue Coach and the Surface Transpor-
tation companies for twenty days. That strike, which of course
had a dire effect on the public, ended when the City of New
York acquired those bus lines by eminent domain and under-
took to operate them directly. 100
Subsequently, on January 1, 1966, the TWU struck the en-
tire New York City subway and bus system. This catastrophic
thirteen-day strike paralyzed the city. It was in direct breach of
the antistrike provisions of the Condon-Wadlin Act and of an
injunction. 1 1 That strike not only disrupted the everyday life of
the general public, but, like the 1980 strike, also specially af-
fected businesses and professions. 02
Since then, the TWU has not been loathe to use, or threaten
to use, the strike weapon regardless of legal proscription. 03 By
its own proclamation, Local 100 "has a historic tradition of 'No
100. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., 235 F. Supp.
842, 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
101. Weinstein v. New York City Transit Auth., 49 Misc. 2d 170, 172-78, 267
N.Y.S.2d 111, 113-24 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1966).
102. See Jamur Products Corp. v. Quill, 51 Misc. 2d 501, 273 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1966).
103. No sooner had the 1966 strike ended than did Local 100 threaten another
strike if the severe Condon-Wadlin Act penalties were applied against it. In the face of
this threat, the legislature hastily immunized Local 100 and the TWU. 1971-1972 REPORT
OF THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON THE TAYLOR LAW, LEG. Doc. No. 25 at 11 (1972).
Local 100 "overwhelmingly" authorized a strike against the New York City subway
system on January 1, 1968, if its contract demands were not met by 5:00 a.m. that day.
New York Times, Dec. 28, 1967, at 41, col. 3; id., Jan. 2, 1968, at 1, col. 1. It also
threatened to strike the subway and bus lines in June 1969. Id., June 22, 1969, at 24, col.
4. It again threatened to strike the subway and bus lines if NYCTA did not meet its
contract demands by 12:01 a.m., Mar. 29, 1978 (despite the prohibitions of the Taylor
Law and a preliminary injunction). Id., Mar. 28, 1978, at 41, col. 1. As recently as Aug.
13, 1981, the TWU continued to insist that it had the right to strike. Id., Aug. 13, 1981,
at 1, col. 3. That the union knew the consequences of a mass transit strike when it made
this claim is clear from its president's 1967 statement: "We know that the last strike cost
the City a lot ...." Id., Dec. 28, 1967, at 1, col. 6.
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contract, No work!' "'10 Other parts of the TWU have repeatedly
demonstrated this same disregard of the law and/or the public
weal.1o6
While the 1980 strike was in progress, Jackson, Lewis,
Schnitzler & Krupman ("Jackson, Lewis"), a Manhattan-based
private law firm, sued the TWU for damages. Seeking to recover
out-of-pocket expenses, as well as general and punitive damages,
its complaint asserted six causes of action, including prima facie
tort and a cause of action implied from violation of the Taylor
Law's strike prohibition.106 A similar suit was brought by the
New York law firm of Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer,
now known as Summit Rovins & Feldesman. That firm's com-
plaint included prima facie tort and public nuisance causes of
action.107 In August 1980, the two actions, having common ques-
tions of fact and some common questions of law, were joined in
Queens County. Cumulatively challenging the legal sufficiency of
all causes of action in both complaints, the unions moved to
dismiss. 108
A. Supreme Court, Queens County
In passing upon the motions to dismiss, supreme court, spe-
cial term, Justice Edwin Kassoff dealt with the eight causes of
action asserted in the two complaints under three general head-
104. Quoted from an advertisement distributed by the TWU during the 1980 strike.
See also TWU, 88 A.D.2d at 55, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
105. For example, a TWU local threatened to strike the Metropolitan Suburban Bus
Authority on Jan. 1, 1980, if its contract demands were not met. New York Times, Dec.
29, 1979, at 24, col. 5. The Metropolitan Suburban Bus Authority, like the New York
City Transit Authority and the Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Au-
thority, is a subsidiary of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority. Like the other
authorities, its employees are subject to the Taylor Law. Other TWU locals have struck
Philadelphia's mass transit system six times between 1951 and 1977 (including a 44-day
walkout in 1977), each time with disastrous effects on that city. Wall Street Journal, Jan.
16, 1968, at 1, col. 3; id., May 9, 1977, at 1, col. 3. The Columbus, Ohio, public transpor-
tation system was struck by a TWU local in November 1976. New York Times, Nov. 16,
1976, at 18, col. 6. On January 24, 1980, the TWU struck Pan American World Airways
in defiance of a restraining order issued by the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of New York. Other unions "called the strike 'illegal.' " Id., Jan. 25, 1980, at
A13, col. 5.
106. See TWU, 88 A.D.2d at 53-54, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 83.
107. Id. at 52-53, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 82.
108. Id. at 55, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 83.
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ings: prima facie (noncategorical) tort, nuisance, and the third-
party beneficiary cause of action asserted by Jackson, Lewis.
Special term held first that Taylor Law remedies for illegal
strikes are nonexclusive and that third parties to the bargaining
relation, including private citizens, may sue for damages.'0 9 The
court found that the only disputed questions regarding the non-
categorical tort causes of action were intent and special dam-
ages.110 As to intent, the court inquired "whether the public's
gain from the defendant's avowed motive outweighs the harm to
the plaintiff and the members of the class."' "[T]he answer," it
concluded, "was given by the New York State Legislature when
it codified the longstanding common-law rule in enacting the
Taylor Law: Strikes by public employees, whatever their pur-
pose, are unlawful acts because of their inherently adverse ef-
fect upon the public.""12
Special term then found that special damages - in the
form of out-of-pocket expenses and lost profits - had been
properly alleged in the complaints. The court found that these
damages were "direct, foreseeable and substantially different in
kind from the potential injury to which the general public was
exposed . .. ."I"
B. Appellate Division, Second Department
On appeal, the appellate division noted at the outset that
"[t]he Taylor Law . . . 'was intended to monitor employer-em-
ployee relationships and not employee relations with the pub-
lic,'"' thus reaffirming its prior Caso holding that the statute's
remedies for illegal strikes are nonexclusive." 5 The court then
proceeded to examine each cause of action separately.
The appellate division applied the standards for suits im-
plied from federal statutes announced by the United States Su-
preme Court in Cort v. Ash" 6 to determine whether the TWU's
109. TWU, 108 Misc. 2d at 464, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 901.
110. Id. at 465-66, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 902.
111. Id. at 467, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 903.
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 475, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 907.
114. TWU, 88 A.D.2d at 58, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 85 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
115. Id.
116. See 422 U.S. at 78. See also supra notes 65-97 and accompanying text.
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violation of the Taylor Law gave rise to an implied cause of ac-
tion under New York law. 11 7 Interestingly, the court's discussion
suggests that these standards had actually been met in the case
before it." 8 The appellate division nonetheless ultimately dis-
missed, relying principally upon what it considered the "very
complexity" of the Taylor Law's enforcement scheme. 1" 9
C. Court of Appeals
The court of appeals affirmed the appellate division's dis-
missal.'20 After discussing the court's treatment of the issues,
this Article will explain why dismissal, unfortunately, appeared
to be a predetermined result for which New York's highest court
vainly attempted to locate a rationale.
1. Exclusivity of Taylor Law Remedies
At the outset, the court seemed to take a familiar analytical
approach to the question of whether Taylor Law remedies are
exclusive and whether a cause of action should be implied from
a violation of the Taylor Law's strike ban. Quoting prior deci-
sions, the court stated: "The general rule is and long has been
that 'when the common law gives a remedy, and another remedy
is provided by statute, the latter is cumulative, unless made ex-
clusive by the statute ... .'"12 The court further stated:
Whether a statute gives a cause of action to a person injured by
its violation, or whether it is intended as a general police regula-
tion, and the violation made punishable solely as a public offense
'must to a great extent depend on the purview of the legislature
in the particular statute and the language which they have there
employed.""
Further indicating that it viewed the exclusivity and im-
117. TWU, 88 A.D.2d at 59, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
118. Id. at 59-65, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 86-90.
119. Id. at 65, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 89-90.
120. 59 N.Y.2d 314, 322, 451 N.E.2d 459, 461, 464 N.Y.S.2d 712, 714 (1983).
121. Id. at 324, 451 N.E.2d at 462, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 715 (quoting Candee v. Hayward,
37 N.Y. 653, 656 (1868)).
122. Id. at 324, 451 N.E.2d at 462-63, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 715-16 (quoting Atkinson v.
New Castle & Gateshead W.W. Co., L.R. [2 Exch. Div.] 441; Taylor v. L.S. & M.S. Ry.
Co., 45 Mich. 74, 7 N.W. 728 (1881)).
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plied right issues as interrelated, the court stated that "[t]he far
better course is for the Legislature to specify in the statute itself
whether its provisions are exclusive and, if not, whether private
litigants are intended to have a cause of action for violation of
those provisions."' 23 Absent explicit legislative guidance, said
the court, "it is for the courts to determine, in light of those
[statutory] provisions, particularly those relating to sanctions
and enforcement, and their legislative history, and of existing
common-law and statutory remedies, with which legislative fa-
miliarity is presumed, what the Legislature intended."'2 "
The court examined the Taylor Law and found "no explicit
statement as to either exclusivity or intent to create a private
cause of action."' 25 The court then concluded that based on an
"[e]xamination of the history and genesis of the Taylor Law,"
the statute "is cumulative, not exclusive, and was not intended
to establish a new cause of action.' ' 12 6
2. Implied Cause of Action
The next four and one-half pages of the court's opinion dis-
cussed the development of the Taylor Law's current statutory
structure.27 Particular emphasis was placed on changes in the
statutory strike sanctions. 28 "Against that background," the
court stated, "for a number of reasons, legislative intent to pro-
vide a private remedy cannot be discerned."' 29 Seemingly, this
could mean that the court found no legislative intent on the is-
sue generally. However, the opinion makes it clear that legisla-
tive intent was deemed to militate against implication of a dam-
age remedy.
The court began its analysis by agreeing that "Jackson,
Lewis is 'one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted.' "1'o It also agreed that "such an action would be a
123. Id. at 325, 451 N.E.2d at 463, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 716.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Note in particular id. at 328-29, 451 N.E.2d at 465, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
129. Id. at 329, 451 N.E.2d at 465, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
130. Id.
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powerful deterrent to public employee strikes .... "131 The court
then stated that an action implied from violation of the Taylor
Law's strike ban "would also, as the claim for [$50,000,000 per
day] damages in the Burns Jackson complaint suggests, [impose]
a crushing burden on the unions and each of the employees par-
ticipating in the strike, who could be held jointly and severally
liable for damages resulting from violation." '132
The court cited several factors in support of its finding that
such a result would be inappropriate. First, it noted that the
Condon-Wadlin Act was repealed "'precisely because that was a
statute punitive rather than constructive in nature.' "133 Second,
it noted the Taylor Law's "'unusually elaborate enforcement
provisions, conferring authority to sue for this purpose both on
government officials and private citizens' which strongly suggest
that the Legislature 'provided precisely the remedies it consid-
ered appropriate. .. ' Third, the court was influenced by
"the 1966 decision in Jamur Products Corp. v. Quill ... which
had held that a private cause of action could not be implied
from the Condon-Wadlin Act."13
Perhaps most significant, however, was the court's conclu-
sion that "[i]mplication of a private action is . . . inconsistent
with the purposes of the Taylor Law."' ' The court elaborated:
Its primary purposes, as both Taylor Committee reports empha-
size, was to defuse the tensions in public employer-employee rela-
tions by reducing the penalties and increasing reliance on negoti-
ation and the newly created Public Employment Relations Board
[PERB] as a vehicle toward labor peace .... A private action,
which would impose per se liability without any of the limitations
applicable to the common-law forms of action .... would inevita-
bly upset the delicate balance established after 20 years of legisla-
tive pondering." 7
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 330, 451 N.E.2d at 465, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 718 (quoting Governor's Com-
mittee on Public Employee Relations, 1968 Interim Report, 20 (1968)).
134. Id. at 330, 451 N.E.2d at 465-66, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 718-19 (quoting Middlesex
County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13, 15 (1981)).
135. Id. (citations omitted).
136. Id.
137. Id.
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The court noted the observation of the Washington Supreme
Court that " 'the schemes created by statute for collective bar-
gaining and dispute resolution must be allowed to function as
intended, without the added coercive power of the courts being
thrown into the balance on one side or the other.' "18
The part of the opinion dismissing the implied cause of ac-
tion was concluded as follows:
Having explicitly directed that in assessing penalties PERB and
the courts consider the union's ability to pay and refused to enact
a decertification provision, the Legislature must be deemed to
have negated the unlimited liability, not only to third parties but
to public employers as well, and the consequent demise of public
employee unions, that would result from recognition of a new
statutory cause of action." 9
The court stated that its dismissal of the implied cause of
action did not "require us to conclude that the traditional,
though more limited, forms of action are no longer available to
redress injury resulting from violation of the statute."1 4 0 The
court explained:
The penalties imposable by PERB and the courts for such a vio-
lation provide some solace, but no recompense, for those injured
by acts which not only violate the statute but also constitute a
breach of duty, independent of the statute, which common-law
remedies made compensable. Although it is within the compe-
tence of the Legislature to abolish common-law causes of action
.... ,there is no express provision to that effect in the statute,
notwithstanding numerous amendments of the Taylor Law after
the decision by the Second Department in Caso v. District Coun-
cil 37, .. . holding that law nonexclusive and a public nuisance
action maintainable.1 4 1
The court reasoned:
It is one thing to conclude that limitation of penaltie payable to
the public treasury and denial of a decertification sanction are
inconsistent with the imposition of a new strict liability cause of
138. Id. (quoting Burke & Thomas, Inc. v. International Org. of Masters, Mates &
Pilots, 92 Wash. 2d 762, 772, 600 P.2d 1282, 1288 (1979)).
139. Id. at 330-31, 451 N.E.2d at 466, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
140. Id. at 331, 451 N.E.2d at 466, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
141. Id. (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
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action, and quite another to conclude that persons damaged by
actions tortious before public strikes were declared illegal should
be denied the recompense to which they would be otherwise enti-
tled in the interest of labor peace.14
The court recognized that "indemnification against such lia-
bility may become a union demand in the bargaining process
and prolong an illegal strike .... ,3 However, the court consid-
ered that
an insufficient basis, absent clearer indication of legislative intent,
to hold the statute pre-emptive of all common-law causes of ac-
tion and thus, as the Supreme Court has said in another context,
"permit the result, extraordinary in our jurisprudence, of a
wrongdoer shifting responsibility for the consequences of his [ac-
tions] onto his victim."""4
The court then turned to the other causes of action asserted
in the two complaints, and dismissed them all.
V. Where The Court Went Wrong
The New York court's decision has all the earmarks of a
predetermined result in search of a convincing rationale. This is
evidenced by the legal lengths to which the court went to reach
its conclusions. In short, as this Article will demonstrate, 45 the
court tortuously construed existing precedent and changed for
the worse settled policies underlying the Taylor Law.
Implicit throughout the decision seemed to be a concern
that if it applied existing New York law to an action to recover
damages arising out of a public sector strike, the court would
improperly be engaged in judicial policymaking or "legislation."
However, by creating a special exemption from existing legal
doctrines for illegal public sector strikes, the court undertook
the very judicial activism it purported to avoid.
142. Id. at 331, 451 N.E.2d at 466-67, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 719-20.
143. Id. at 331, 451 N.E.2d at 467, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 720 (citations omitted).
144. Id. at 331-32, 451 N.E.2d at 467, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 720 (quoting Wyandotte
Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 204 (1967)).
145. See infra text accompanying notes 146-179.
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A. Implied Cause of Action: New Law and New Policy
In dismissing the implied cause of action, the court de-
parted from longstanding New York law. The implied cause of
action should have been upheld once the court concluded that 1)
Jackson, Lewis was among the class of intended beneficiaries of
the Taylor Law's strike ban, and 2) the firm suffered damages
proximately caused by the TWU's breach. Although it agreed
that Jackson, Lewis was among the class for whose especial ben-
efit the Taylor Law was enacted, the court's new construction of
New York law made it unnecessary to consider proximate
causation.
1. The Shifting Focal Point of Legislative Intent
Interestingly, the court neither explicitly abandoned the
New York rule nor explicitly adopted the federal rule. Its first
step was to change the focal point of the "legislative intent" in-
quiry under New York law. On this issue, the court appeared to
be under the mistaken belief that Jackson, Lewis' contentions
ignored legislative intent.' 6 Legislative intent is indeed very sig-
nificant. Settled New York law had held that legislative intent
on the question of whether a plaintiff was among the class of a
statute's intended beneficiaries was crucial. "7 In TWU, the
court looked instead to legislative intent on the specific question
of whether an implied cause of action should be recognized.
The latter approach, which more closely approximates the
federal standard," 8 is really a contradiction in terms. Obviously,
if legislative intent existed on the specific question of whether a
damage action should be available to private parties, there
would be little need to imply a cause of action. Only because
there typically is no legislative intent on that specific question
(as is the case with the Taylor Law) did it become necessary to
recognize implied causes of action."'
The U.S. Supreme Court's attempts to divine congressional
intent on the narrower issue must be considered in light of its
146. New York City Transit Auth. v. Lindner, 59 N.Y.2d 314, 325, 451 N.E.2d 459,
463, 464 N.Y.S.2d 712, 716 (1983).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 34-37.
148. See supra text accompanying note 69.
149. See Kaplan, supra note 29.
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broader objectives. The Cort v. Ash standards reflect the Su-
preme Court's efforts to limit recourse to overburdened federal
courts.150 While not suggesting that the New York judiciary has
time on its hands, the absolute explosion of federal statutory law
over the past half century generally, and the past twenty years
in particular, has not been matched at the state level.1 51 If pri-
vate causes of action could be asserted based on all, most, or
even a significant proportion of these federal statutes, the pro-
verbial floodgates of litigation might actually be opened.
In any event, the practical explanation for the development
of federal rules affords no compelling legal reason for their adop-
tion by states. In fact, as previously noted,'52 the Supreme
Court's federal rules simply could not be adopted wholesale for
use in state courts. One element of the federal test is whether
the subject matter has traditionally been relegated to state
law, 53 a consideration that has no sensible application to a cause
of action implied from breach of a state statute.
Even the contradictory focus of the legislative intent in-
quiry under Cort v. Ash makes more sense in the context of fed-
eral statutes. Typically, legislative intent is much more identifi-
able in federal statutes than in state laws. The legislative
process is more heavily documented at the federal level than at
the state level. Therefore, it may be possible to determine
whether Congress actually intended a private action to be im-
plied from a violation of a federal statute. Such a narrow inquiry
at the state level can yield only extrapolation by judges as to
what the legislature meant when it did and said nothing. Incon-
sistency and judicial legislation of the sort engaged in by the
TWU court are the inevitable results of such "analyses.' ' 54
Discerning who the statute was intended to protect - the
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See supra text accompanying note 66.
153. Id.
154. The arguments raised on this issue exemplify this problem. Since the legisla-
ture has never made any explicit statements on private causes of action, the parties de-
bated whether silence in the aftermath of Caso was more meaningful than silence after
Jamur. While one argument might be more intellectually appealing than the other, see
supra text accompanying notes 70-77, it is most unrealistic to believe that the legislature
had any intent on the specific question. The Cort standard, applied at the state level,
necessarily requires such fictional digressions.
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key inquiry under the traditional New York rule - is a much
less speculative process. While some statutes might appear un-
necessary at times, rarely is the purported reason for a statute's
existence a mystery. And if we know why a statute was enacted,
it is not a difficult progression to determine who the statute is
intended to protect. Who the statute is intended to protect is a
question that cannot be separated from the reason for a statute's
enactment. Indeed, as in the Taylor Law, the intended benefi-
ciaries might even be identified in the statute itself.155 That gen-
eral inquiry requires far less speculation than the specific ques-
tion whether the legislature intended a statute to give rise to a
private damage action.
2. The Court's Misguided Perception of "Labor
Harmony"
The court's new approach to the legislative intent inquiry
paved the way for speculation concerning the consistency with
the Taylor Law's statutory structure of an implied cause of ac-
tion. 156 In this regard, the court could not deny that a private
damage action would promote the Taylor Law's goal of deterring
strikes by public employees - a goal which, until the court's
decision in TWU, had always been construed as the paramount
concern of the Taylor Law. 157 The TWU court, however, for the
first time elevated the legislature's interest in "labor harmony"
over and above that of deterring strikes.1 58
It is unnecessary to resolve an esoteric debate as to whether
strike deterrence is more important than "labor harmony." Once
the TWU intentionally violated the Taylor Law by shutting
down mass transit to the detriment of millions of New Yorkers,
labor peace had already been breached. This breaching of the
peace was brought about by the TWU's own illegal conduct.
Neither government officials nor the members of the public
155. See N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 200 (McKinney 1983). "[Tlhe purpose of [the] act
[is] to protect the public by assuring . . . the orderly and uninterrupted functions of
government. These policies are best effectuated by. . . continuing the prohibition against
strikes by public employees and providing remedies for violations of such prohibition."
Id.
156. TWU, 59 N.Y.2d at 330, 451 N.E.2d at 466, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
157. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 78.
158. TWU, 59 N.Y.2d at 329-31, 451 N.E.2d at 465, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
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damaged by the TWU's illegal strike were responsible for the
Union's misconduct.
Did the TWU's strike promote "labor harmony"? And if
not, why should the TWU's breaches of "labor harmony" be
condoned or excused while that same statutory goal is invoked
as rationalization for insulating the TWU from the private con-
sequences of its illegal conduct? In assessing the implied cause
of action, the court totally ignored the breach of "labor har-
mony" caused by the TWU when it violated the Taylor Law to
the detriment of millions of New Yorkers. Instead, it equated
"labor harmony" with placating and protecting the TWU. In so
doing, the court engaged in the worst possible form of
appeasement.
It is bad law and policy to protect a wrongdoer at the ex-
pense of his innocent victim. Despite its lip service to this
fact, 159 that is precisely what the court did. The facts of the
TWU case make the court's treatment of the competing inter-
ests particularly unpalatable. That was not a case where a party
negligently and unknowingly caused unforeseeable damages by
violating an arcane or obscure technical legal proscription. The
law is crystal clear. It is equally clear that the TWU intention-
ally broke the law. A union simply cannot shut down mass
transit in New York City by accident. And, based on its own
prior record, the TWU knew in advance exactly what effect its
illegal strike would have.16 °
The TWU's conduct was consistent with labor outlawry, not
"labor harmony." Yet, the court ruled that a private party dam-
aged by the strike could not recover because that would upset
labor harmony. In any event, permitting the TWU to escape the
private consequences of its wrong does not promote any realistic
conception of "labor harmony."
3. The Phantom "Crushing Burden"
In its dismissal of the implied cause of action, the court also
seemed influenced by the "crushing burden" that a limitless per
se statutory cause of action would impose on public sector un-
159. Id. at 331-32, 451 N.E.2d at 466-67, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 719-20.
160. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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ions. 161 In so framing the issue, the court ignored the fact that
no union would face any burden if it simply adhered to the Tay-
lor Law's clear statutory language and did not strike. The
court's stated assumptions as to the nature and consequences of
recognizing an implied cause of action are similarly flawed.
What burden would truly befall a scofflaw public sector
union were an implied cause of action recognized? True, Burns
Jackson asserted as a prayer for relief in its class action suit
$50,000,000 per day in damages. The court cited this figure to
support its claim that the financial burden would be truly crush-
ing were an implied cause of action recognized.' However,
Burns Jackson's prayer for relief had nothing whatever to do
with the possible consequences of recognizing an implied cause
of action; Burns Jackson did not assert an implied cause of ac-
tion."8 3 Jackson, Lewis did assert an implied cause of action, and
its prayer for relief was for out-of-pocket damages estimated,
not at $50,000,000 per day, but at $25,000 for the duration of
the strike. 64 Ironically, the court dismissed Jackson, Lewis' im-
plied cause of action based in part on Burns Jackson's prayer for
relief, then made no mention of the amount of damages sought
when it dismissed the causes of action asserted by Burns Jack-
son for other reasons. 6 5 This sleight-of-hand is a telling indica-
tor of the court's desperation to dismiss the consolidated suits.
4. Implied Cause of Action as a Common-Law Cause of
Action
Consider next the court's statement that an implied cause
of action would impose limitless per se statutory liability.'
Such liability would result from recognizing an implied cause of
action only if the court again departed from established New
York law. That traditional approach permits recovery only
where a specific intended beneficiary of a statute can show dam-
ages proximately caused by a statutory breach.'
161. TWU, 59 N.Y.2d at 329, 451 N.E.2d at 465, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 718.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 323, 451 N.E.2d at 462, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 715.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 333, 335, 451 N.E.2d at 468, 469, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 721, 722.
166. Id. at 330-31, 451 N.E.2d at 466, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 61-64.
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While the court properly recognized that each member of
the general public is an intended beneficiary of the Taylor Law's
strike ban, it hardly follows that every member of the general
public could prove damages proximately caused by the strike. It
is questionable whether such damages could have been proved
by anyone who did not rely on mass transit for his or her liveli-
hood. Even people who were unable to get to work because of
the strike might have been unable to prove damages if their em-
ployers paid them for that time. Similarly, if alternative means
of getting to work were not more costly than that provided by
the struck mass transit system, there would have been no dam-
ages. These are only a few examples, but the point is clear.
Rather than truly examining actual provable damages, the court
was swayed by the "horrible ifs" scenario painted by the TWU.
Had the plaintiffs ever been put to their proofs, damages proxi-
mately caused by the strike would have been surprisingly low.
The court also distinguished between what it called the
statutory liability of an implied cause of action and "more lim-
ited" traditional common-law causes. 68 In so doing, the court
ignored the fact that implied causes of action have always been
considered common-law causes of action in New York. 69 In New
York, a statute merely defines a duty whose breach is compensa-
ble in a common-law action for damages.17 0 If a statute does not
expressly provide a private damage remedy, there simply is no
statutory cause of action. The supposed distinction between
common-law and implied causes of action appears to have been
constructed especially for the TWU case.
5. Exclusivity Versus the Complexity of the Taylor Law's
Statutory Structure
Prior to its TWU decision, the court of appeals had never
considered the question of whether the Taylor Law's strike pen-
alties should be deemed exclusive. In holding that they were not,
the court may have felt constrained by the legislature's inaction
in the aftermath of the second department's Caso holding."1
168. TWU, 59 N.Y.2d at 331, 451 N.E.2d at 466, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
169. See supra text accompanying note 3.
170. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 34, 36, 37, 62.
171. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
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Whatever the court's motivation, its reasoning in holding the
Taylor Law's remedies nonexclusive actually undermines its
conclusion that Taylor Law remedies are so comprehensive as to
preclude a private right of action.
In Caso v. District Council 37,172 the appellate division first
listed the variety of enforcement provisions and penalties availa-
ble to punish violations of the Taylor Law. 17' After acknowledg-
ing these various penalties, the court nonetheless specifically al-
lowed a damage action by third parties.174 In TWU, the
appellate division described the statutory provisions in virtually
the same words it used a decade ago. 175 Only this time, inexpli-
172. 43 A.D.2d 159, 350 N.Y.S.2d 173 (2d Dep't 1973).
173. Id. at 161, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 176.
174. The cause of action sustained in Caso was for public nuisance. There, the court
stated that "[a] common-law cause of action in nuisance would appear to be the appro-
priate remedy in the instant case .... The claim itself ... does represent a cause of
action .. " 43 A.D.2d at 163, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 178.
175. TWU, 88 A.D.2d at 65, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 89. In Caso, the court described the
Taylor Law as follows:
The Taylor Law provides that public employees and their union may be punished
for engaging in a strike, the employees by loss of pay at twice the daily rate of pay
for each day's involvement, the union by loss of its "dues check-off" right, and
that the strike may be enjoined by the Supreme Court. Further, in the event of
violation of such an injunction, the striking employees and their union may be
punished by fines for contempt of court, and the employees also jailed.
43 A.D.2d at 161, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 176 (citations omitted).
The court later concluded:
In summary, then, the Taylor Law was not intended to provide the exclusive rem-
edies in the event of a strike by public employees. The statute itself states that it
is intended to govern employer-employee relationships for the benefit of the pub-
lic; it does not indicate that it is intended to immunize public employees from all
punishment except that meted out by the chief legal officer of the government
involved. It is well settled by the cases that the provisions of the Taylor Law are
to be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose. The purpose of the Taylor Law
is, inter alia, "to protect the public by assuring, at all times, the orderly and unin-
terrupted operations and functions of government." That purpose can best be
served by interpreting the Taylor Law provisions as nonexclusive as to remedies
against public employees for damages caused by an illegal strike.
43 A.D.2d at 163, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 177-78 (citations omitted).
However, in TWU, the court described the Taylor Law in much the same way, but came
to an opposite conclusion, stating:
The enforcement scheme prescribed by the Taylor Law is quite comprehensive,
and includes, inter alia, the power to enjoin an illegal strike, to punish a union
and its members for their willful violation of any such injunction, to deprive a
striking union of its "dues check-off" privileges for an indefinite period of time,
and to deduct from the compensation of every public employee who has been
found to have violated its provisions "an amount equal to twice his daily rate of
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cably, the same court concluded that "[i]t is this very complex-
ity which militates against a determination that an additional
remedy, i.e., a private cause of action, should be deemed to ex-
ist. '176 The court of appeals took the same approach to both
issues. 1
77
These conclusions - drawn from a virtually identical set of
premises - are irreconcilable. The language of the Caso court
was sweeping and not confined to any particular cause of ac-
tion. 78 There is, said the Caso court, no "wisdom in a decision
which puts the 'right' of a public union to engage in illegal activ-
ities entirely beyond the court's ability to find suitable redress
.... 179 Yet, that was precisely the practical effect of the court
of appeals' decision in TWU. The appellate division was right in
Caso; both the appellate division and the court of appeals erred
in TWU.
VI. Conclusion
The New York experience is instructive for a number of rea-
sons. The principal flaw in TWU was that while the court stated
that the matter should be treated no differently than any other
implied cause of action, the result it reached was actually a de-
parture from settled law governing implied causes of action.
It is hoped that even if New York does not reconsider its
analysis, other jurisdictions will avoid New York's mistake.
pay for each day or part thereof" that he has been found to have participated in
an illegal strike.
88 A.D.2d at 65, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 89 (citations omitted).
176. Id. at 65, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 89 (emphasis added).
177. TWU, 59 N.Y.2d at 325-31, 451 N.E.2d at 462-66, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 715-19.
178. Caso v. District Council 37, 43 A.D.2d 159, 162, 350 N.Y.S.2d 173, 176-77. See
supra text accompanying notes 12, 13, 56, 57.
179. Id. at 162, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 177.
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